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BOOK REVIEWS
DISASTER BY DECREE by Lino Graglia. London: Cornell
University Press, 1976. Pp. 351. $11.50.
No one can charge Lino Graglia with timidity in stating his views.
Six years ago, when racially preferential admissions first became a hot
topic for law schools, Professor Graglia took on Derrick Bell in the
pages of an effete eastern law review, arguing the case against
minority admissions programs.1 In their struggle Bell drew first blood
by asserting that Graglia's presentation, "[w]hile assumedly written
for the legal profession,... eschews legal analysis for vague,
unsupported suggestions that such programs may constitute 'reverse
discrimination.' "2
Disaster by Decree' seems to have been written to answer Bell's
criticism. Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,4 Professor
Graglia traces national efforts at school desegregation, constantly
pricking the Court's egalitarian balloon with his needle of logic. How
can the 1954 Brown decision, he asks, which forbade consideration
of race in school assignments, justify current relief decrees that
require courts and school boards to consider race?' This attack
indeed may catch affirmative action proponents at their Achilles'
heel, for preferential admissions programs, if not actually spawned by
admiration of the courts' desegregation efforts, draw constitutional
strength from the courts' own repeated assumption of the power to
make race a factor in school admissions.6
Although perhaps inspired by his debates with Bell, Profes-
sor Graglia aims this book at a much wider audience than that
concerned with law school admissions. He lashes out at every judicial
1. See Graglia, Special Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 351 (1970); Bell, In Defense of Minority Admissions Programs: A Response to Professor
Graglia, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 364 (1970).
2. Bell, supra note 1, at 364.
3. L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 457, 470 (1972) (parcelling of
single school district into two districts resulting in imbalanced race ratio impeded process of
dismantling discriminatory system and was enjoined); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971) (limited use of ratios of black/white pupil composition within
equitable remedial discretion of district court); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439
(1968) (effectiveness of desegregation plan to be evaluated by degree of racial integration
achieved).
6. See Comment, Race Quotas, 8 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 128, 141-46
(1973).
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action touching upon public school desegregation, consistently
declaring the courts' incompetence and bad faith in formulating
desegregation decrees. By exposing the supposed venality of the
courts' shift away from Brown's colorblind standard to later cases
approving color consciousness, Professor Graglia lays the groundwork
for his concluding roar that busing is unconstitutional and that
neighborhood schools are constitutionally required.
DISASTER BY DECREE
Historical in format, Disaster by Decree focuses primarily on the
important Supreme Court cases that shaped school desegregation
efforts during the decades following Brown.' Each case is treated in a
standardized manner: a detailed statement of the factual circum-
stances of the litigation is followed by a scholastic, sometimes tedious
discussion of the Court's opinion, in which Professor Graglia
challenges the Court's reasoning and results. Strong historical
continuity, as wel as forays to attack administrative agencies and
lower courts,9 relieve any tendency toward boredom created by the
standardized case analyses.
Although Graglia has fed many of the pages with the fodder that
grows law review articles into books, his emphasis on detail is often
the most interesting and valuable aspect of the book. The factual
discussions of recent cases, in which the Supreme Court refused to
review the lower courts' findings of discrimination and ruled only as
to the remedy, are especially informative and go far toward bolstering
the author's assertion that district courts have pushed desegregation
too far. 10 On the other hand, his detailed dissection of court opinions
often degenerates into unfortunate wordiness.
More unfortunate is Professor Graglia's unnecessarily combative
presentation of his case. Puffery and caustic asides make books lively,
7. L. GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 203-83; cf. id. at 76-77 (alternative "freedom of choice"
plans called impermissibly discriminatory).
8. See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Green v. County School Bd.,
391 U.S. 430 (1968); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Wright v. Council of City of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 719-44 (9th ed. 1975).
9. E.g., L. GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 58-66 (blasting the Fifth Circuit; praising district court
Judge William Cox); id. at 55 (criticizing Office of Education guidelines).
10. See id. at 104-32 (Swann); id. at 203-34 (Milliken); cf. id. at 160-76, 178-84 (Supreme
Court's reexamination of district court's finding of violation, but in context of remedy).
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but one quickly notices that a certain contrariness begins to infect
the author's judgment. This impairment stands out especially in the
opening chapters, where Graglia argues that Brown was an easy and
popular decision, yet there was massive resistance to it; that the
Court erred in arrogating to itself the power to decide the issue, yet
Brown I11 was decided wrongly because the Court refused to
arrogate to itself the power to foreclose local school board
discretion; 12 and that the Office of Education meddled too much in
local affairs, yet the Office of Education deferred too much to local
boards by permitting freedom of choice. 3
At times Graglia's desire to find the Court and the federal agencies
wrong, not just on many points, but on every point, leads to serious
historical distortions. Federal desegregation efforts take on a
conspiratorial air when Graglia accuses the Civil Rights Commission
and the Office of Education of permitting freedom of choice so that
southern school boards would fall into the trap of allowing the
agency subsequently to question the degree of desegregation.14 I have
never noticed such crafty thinking in either agency.
This overzealous condemnation of the Court and the federal
agencies is particularly unfortunate because the reader, having
dismissed some arguments as contrived or contrary, also may reject
some of the book's genuine accomplishments. The subtle shift of the
Court and the agencies in defining desegregation is well documented,
the author showing that the term initially contemplated only
remedying officially imposed segregation, but was expanded later to
include correction of all segregation, even that occasioned by private
decisionmaking.'5 Graglia also roasts a favorite liberal chestnut in his
11. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
12. One wonders whether the author seriously believes some of the arguments he uses in
criticizing the Court. For example, in urging that the Court should have foreclosed local discretion
and required district zoning as the only permissible remedy, the author appears to violate the
cardinal conservative principle that courts should not replace local discretion but should merely
confine the exercise of that discretion to constitutional limits. See L. GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at
35-37, 77-79; cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (relief in reapportionment cases initially
for legislature to enact); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 349-50 (1939) (immigration and
naturalization case; so long as government officer's exercise of discretion within constitutional
bounds, court will not review it). Compare Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (despite
express terms of devise of land to city, park could not be operated on racially discriminatory basis)
with Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439, 445 (1970) (state court's discretion to provide equitable
remedy of reversion of property to heirs and elimination of park not constitutionally limited; loss
shared equally by both races).
13. L. GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 13-45.
14. Id. at 52-58.
15. Id.
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discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 The Act provides that,
while officially imposed segregation is prohibited, correction of mere
racial imbalance is not required. 17 Liberals always argue that this
provision applies only to de facto violations and that court remedies
after a finding of de jure segregation may go further and cure mere
racial imbalance.18 Graglia's excerpts from the legislative history of
the Act convinced me that the statute's drafters intended to limit
both violations and remedies.' 9
THE NEW CONSENSUS
American constitutional law is in fact little different from the
common law, for its life has not been the logic that Professor Graglia
espouses, but rather experience, the felt necessities of the time, and
prevalent moral and political theories.20 At any time of change in the
constitutional order, the old movement is likely to lurch on for
awhile as its opponents form the new consensus and, more
importantly, try to discover the errors of the preceding movement
that led it into disfavor.
BUILDING THE NEW CONSENSUS
Representing an ascending movement's challenge to the desegrega-
tion efforts of the previous 20-odd years, Graglia must carry the
burden of building the new consensus and pointing out past errors. In
this he is only marginally successful. Pressing hard the thesis that
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000 (1970).
17. Id. §401(b), 42 U.S.C. §2000c(b) (1970); cf. id. §407(a), 42 U.S.C. §2a00c-6(a) (no
federal officer or court may order busing to remedy racial imbalance).
18. The Fifth Circuit has employed this approach. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 886 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 840 (1967).
19. See L. GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 49-52. The misreading of the statute by liberals and
courts was not stimulated simply by their desire to achieve their social goals. Undoubtedly, they
also sought to avoid the historically intractable constitutional issue whether Congress may limit
the federal courts' jurisdiction with regard to constitutional violations and remedies. See Hart, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 6 HARV.
L. REV. 1362 (1953); Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower
Federal Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839 (1976). See generally P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 309-75 (2d ed. 1973). The desire to avoid
resolution of this issue apparently affects conservatives and moderates as well as liberals. See
Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228, 1229 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1972) (congressionally
mandated stay pending appeal of district court orders requiring transportation of students to
achieve racial balance does not require stay of district court order under any other desegregation
plan).
20. Cf. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
DISASTER BY DECREE
curative efforts which focus on race, especially preference-granting
programs, are just as race-conscious and discriminatory as segregation
itself, Graglia lends his support to others who already have begun to
build this new consensus.21
For the most part, however, Graglia fails to resolve the practical
and philosophical anomalies that result from his argument that the
Constitution is colorblind. In judging whether a party has
discriminated on the basis of race, judges, juries, and society must
focus their attention on the racial issue; inherent in color blindness is
some degree of color consciousness. If they detect a constitutional
violation, the question of relief further turns their attention to race.
And should it not be that way? Should Congress and the courts blind
themselves to the fact that the problems of black people are among
society's greatest and that the fourteenth amendment obviously was
passed to remedy the suffering of blacks?22
The practical anomalies are no less great. Few of us, I would guess,
are willing to return to the days when courts entered mere
prohibitory decrees,23 which were so unenforceable that in reality
discrimination continued. Fewer still would accept the proposition
that the equal protection clause prohibits congressional attempts at
compensatory problem solving. Even the Burger Court has used the
rational basis test in approving the use of sex as a factor in providing
tax relief to women retirees because women historically have suffered
discrimination.24 Should not the Court also, therefore, approve the
use of race as a factor in providing relief to blacks who have suffered
even graver discrimination? In the remedial context, to forbid
focusing on race effectively prevents Congress, courts, and state
21. See, e.g., De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 336 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("no
constitutional right for any race to be preferred"); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of
Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1975) (imposition of racial quota on state civil
service eligibility list constitutionally improper); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638,
501 F.2d 622 634-39 (2d Cir. 1974) (Hays, J., dissenting) (racism inherent in labor employment
quotas inconsistent with legislative history of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Kaplan, Equal Justice in
an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 NW. U.L. REV.
363, 367-88 (1966) (racial employment quotas ineffective as remedies; cause racist attitudes to
persist). But see Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
723 (1974) (some racial preference quotas constitutional).
22. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-72 (1873) (fourteenth amendment
designed to alleviate the legal disabilities and curtailment of rights of blacks after emancipation).
23. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359, 364 (1970) (grand jury list recompiled by
commissioners under court order still discriminatory); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145,
154 (1965) (decree prohibiting future voting discrimination inadequately remedies history of prior
discrimination).
24. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974); cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508
(1975) (compensatory promotion program for women naval officers to remedy historical
discrimination in advancement opportunities upheld).
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legislatures from dealing with one of the greatest problems in
America today-discrimination against blacks.
Were Professor Graglia to dig deeper, I suspect he would find
popular dissatisfaction with race-conscious relief efforts to be
founded not so much upon a rejection of all efforts to aid blacks, as
upon a suspicion that many such efforts are arbitrary in their
goals or work to remedy a nonexistent problem.2" This suggests that
the new consensus should not be based upon color blindness, but
upon restricting color consciousness to those situations in which it
will cure black problems that have been proved to exist.26
PROBLEMS OF THE EXISTING ORDER
Just as Professor Graglia has erred in identifying the new consensus
that is a predicate to a new constitutional order, he also has
misidentified the problems of the existing order that led to the
dissatisfaction. Disaster By Decree focuses upon two mistakes of the
past, the change from desegregation decrees to integration decrees
and the move from decrees affecting only the South to those also
reaching the North.
As it often is with persons who undertake a detailed study of one
phenomenon, Professor Graglia has a tendency to think that many
decisions and decisionmaking techniques are peculiar to the one
phenomenon studied. He limits his field of vision to the historical
sequence of topics within that one area of study, without considering
the wider changes in law or society. When Professor Graglia correctly
focuses on Green v. County School Board2 7 as the turning point in
court desegregation decrees, because it judged desegregation efforts
25. The most persuasive part of Disaster by Decree, for example, suggests that many
metropolitan desegregation decrees encounter implementation problems because of serious doubt
that the school district was guilty of discrimination to begin with. See L. GRAGLIA, supra note 3,
at 161-76 (Denver); id. at 204-15 (Detroit). Similarly, affirmative action programs sometimes may
be directed at unsubstantiated claims of inequality or be imposed in an arbitrary manner that
attempts to make no correlation between the underlying discrimination and the remedy imposed.
See Flanagan v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, Civ. No. 75-1500, at 4 n.7, 7
(D.D.C. July 28, 1976) (under affirmative action program to increase minority enrollment,
nonminority student with estimated greater financial need received one-fifth of scholarship
amount awarded several minority students).
26. The Court, for example, might use the compelling state interest test, which requires
showing of a substantial state interest and a narrowly drawn remedy. Assuming that curing past
discrimination is a substantial state interest, the Court might nevertheless require that the remedy
be drawn narrowly as to duration and be proportional to the discrimination. See Comment, supra
note 6, at 131-41; cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (state
tax exemption granted solely on basis of gender status, like classifications based upon race,
alienage, and national origin, must be subjected to close scrutiny).
27. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
[Vol. 65:181
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by numerical results rather than by intentions,28 he sees the opinion
as a sinister new technique designed specifically to promote school
integration. Nothing could be further from the truth: the concern in
Green over results-the actual numbers of black students in
desegregated schools-reflects the use of a decisionmaking technique
suggested in the 1880's,29 developed in jury discrimination litigation
since the 19301s,3 °  and widely used in a variety of factual
circumstances over the last 20 years.'
This decisonmaking technique is the statistical prima facie case. It
calls for the court to compare the actual percentage of participation
of blacks with the statistically determined percentage that one would
expect absent discrimination, usually a random sample. Any
significant discrepancy between actual and neutrally projected
participation raises the rebuttable presumption that racial discrimina-
tion led to the discrepancy.32 From this beginning it was a short and
logical step for the Court in the 1960's to begin to use statistics not
simply to judge whether there initially had been a constitutional
violation, but to judge whether any discrimination was continuing
under court-mandated relief. 33
Because the statistical prima facie case is the core of judicial
concern with numerical results, it is not surprising that in the last
28. Id. at 439.
29. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (use of statistics to show discriminatory
impact of administration of city ordinance).
30. See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935) (that no black in memory had
served on any jury prima facie evidence of denial of equal protection); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306
U.S. 354, 360 (1939) (total exclusion of blacks from jury service not due to their failure to possess
statutory qualifications); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 129 (1940) (statistics on grand jury
membership showed discrimination in selection); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 468 (1947)
(uncontradicted showing that no black had served on jury in 30 years despite presence of qualified
blacks on registration list); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 548 (1967) (45 percent of county
population black, yet within memory no black had served on jury; prima facie case established).
31. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2045, 2050 & n.12 (1976) (public
employment); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd en banc, 461
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (municipal services), Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (public
housing). See generally Comment, supra note 6, at 134.
32, See Fessler & Haar, Beyond the Wrong Side of the Tracks: Municipal Services in the
Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 441, 450 (1971) (to confront
a prima facie case of discrimination documented by plaintiff's statistical evidence, defendant must
either refute that statistical showing or establish an alternative explanation of disparity);
Comment, supra note 6, at 131-35.
33. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 147-54 (1965) (historical review of
discrimination in voter registration); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 349-51 (1970) (jury case).
In Turner the plaintiffs prevailed on the merits by showing a statistical disparity between blacks
eligible for jury service and blacks actually called. Id. at 352. The district court ordered essentially
prohibitory relief, but when the reconstituted jury rolls showed a continuing underrepresentation
of blacks, the Supreme Court held that this statistical discrepancy indicated that discrimination
was continuing under the district court's decree and that the district court thereafter should have
instituted more effective relief. Id. at 359.
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half-decade conservatives of more incisive vision than Professor
Graglia have worked steadily to erode this decisionmaking technique.
First criticized and rejected by Justice Rehnquist in his opinion for
the Court in Jefferson v. Hackney,34 the device suffered great, though
presently indeterminate, injury when the Court last term decided
Washington v. Davis.35  In short, while Professor Graglia turns his
Roto-Rooter on quotas, others with a fine scalpel have begun to
excise the fat from the underlying technique that fostered quotas.3 6
Not only does Professor Graglia err as to the decisionmaking tech-
niques that led to much popular dissatisfaction with school desegrega-
tion decrees, he also errs in his identification of the sociopolitical roots
of that dissatisfaction. He follows the conventional wisdom that
integration became unpopular when courts began to enforce school
desegregation principles outside the South.3" Few can argue with the
conventional view in the sense that as, of course, desegregation
decrees affected greater numbers of people, dissatisfaction grew. An
equally strong case, however, can be made for the thesis that the
shift in desegregation, not from south to north and west, but from
rural areas to cities, caused the present dissatisfaction with
desegregation decrees. Proponents of this thesis would argue that
reliance on numerical results, the Court's chosen enforcement
technique, works well in rural areas where a few schools serve an area
with little or no segregation in housing. In such areas one would
expect almost total school integration absent purposeful official
segregation, and thus courts properly may focus on numerical results
as an acceptable technique for judging compliance with the equal
protection clause.
Urban areas, whether southern, northern, or western, present a
different situation, for larger cities usually have a great number of
34. 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972) (disparaging plaintiffs' "naked statistical argument" asserting
discrimination in disparate allocation of welfare funds).
35. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2051 (1976) (disproportionate impact of police recruitment procedures did
not warrant finding of discrimination). Although confusing and sometimes unilluminating in its
discussion of the statistical prima facie case, the Court's opinion apparently retains the test, but
simply finds that the inference of discrimination, in this case, had been adequately rebutted. See
id. Even this reading suggests, however, that the technique's utility will be seriously diminished if
lower courts routinely determine that the plaintiff's case has been rebutted. Cf. Hawkins v. Town
of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162, 1167-69 (N.D. Miss. 1969), rev'd, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971),
aff'd en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (lower court dismissal reversed because plaintiffs
presented prima facie statistical case of racial discrimination).
36. See Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2047-51 (1976) (disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but neither is it incontrovertible proof of discrimination). The only serious fat inheres in
judicial and administrative use of the statistical prima facie case and quotas without regard for the
practical drawbacks of the technique and the constitutional limits of quotas themselves. See
Comment, supra note 6, at 136-41.
37. L. GRAGLIA, supra note 3, at 160-61, 178-97.
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schools and substantial housing segregation.38 In the urban setting,
therefore, one would not expect a great deal of integration even
absent discriminatory official action; consequently, focusing on
overall numcical balancing of races in each school as a remedy for
school segregation carries with it an air of unreality. That unreality,
however, is not a western or northern phenomenon, but an urban
one, and the Court's recent ruling in Pasadena City Board of
Education v. Spangler, 3 9 prohibiting year-by-year adjustment of racial
composition of schools because of demographic changes resulting
from normal migration patterns,40 undoubtedly will be repeated in
other urban cases throughout the nation.41
CONCLUSION
Disaster by Decree to a great extent is a book which time is
passing by. Professor Graglia detected the Court's shift from decrees
remedying officially imposed segregation to those remedying all
segregation. To the extent that the recent Spangler decision refocuses
judicial attention upon the extent of official misconduct,42 Graglia's
criticism of the Warren Court has drawn the Burger Court's
endorsement.
Yet Graglia may have won the battle over school desegregation,
but lost the larger war over affirmative action, quotas, and other
race-conscious relief. He never saw the importance of statistics in
proving constitutional violations or prescribing relief. Unscathed by
his book, and not yet destroyed by the Burger Court, statistics
remain a critical concern for courts, and their use in such areas as
employment and college admissions, in which the demographic
changes that undo school desegregation decrees will have little
impact, provides the backbone of legitimacy for racial quotas.
Charles F. Abernathy*
38. See Foster, Desegregating Urban Schools: A Review of Techniques, 43 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 5, 14-31 (1973). See generally Calkins & Gordon, The Right to Choose an Integrated
Education: Voluntary Regional Integrated Schools-A Partial Remedy for De Facto Segregation, 9
HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 171, 172 (1974).
39. 96 S. Ct. 2697 (1976).
40. Id. at 2704. The decision by Justice Rehnquist represents a victory for principles stated in
his earlier dissent in Keyes v. School District No. 1. See 413 U.S. 189, 258 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (to require affirmative racial mixing beyond neutrally drawn boundary lines is different
from requiring that a genuinely dual system be disestablished).
41. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971) (dictum)
(once racial discrimination through official action is eliminated, neither school authorities nor
district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of racial
composition of schools).
42. 96 S. Ct. at 2704-05.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; A.B. 1969, Harvard
University; J.D. 1973, Harvard University; co-founder 1971, attorney 1973-75, The Southern
Poverty Law Center.
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JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN
COURTHOUSE by Arthur Rosett & Donald R. Cressey. Philadelphia:
J.B. Lippincott Co. 1976. Pp. 227.
Justice by Consent1 purports to illustrate the workings of the plea
bargaining system in the United States in a manner comprehensible to
nonexperts. 2 It is a book about doing justice, in which the authors,
Professors Rosett and Cressey, characterize the legal system as
depending upon the interaction of discretion and justice, an interaction
that, in their view, all too often breaks down. The authors indict the
existing system as being arbitrary and capricious because it coerces
defendants into pleading guilty. They illustrate this indictment by
following a hypothetical case from arrest through guilty plea. Unfortu-
nately, because there is simply no such thing as a typical case, the
authors' portrait, accurate only in part, ultimately misleads the reader.
The book begins by contrasting the idealized portrait of the
courthouse, painted by the mass media, with justice as it works in the
real world. This picture is indeed dim: empty and silent courtrooms
filled, not with judges presiding over trials, but with prosecutors and
defense attorneys bureaucratically processing cases with a chilling
detachment. Tactics, rather than justice, dominate. The system favors
the hardened, repeat offender and reserves its harshness for the weakest
and least powerful.
Into this portrait, Rosett and Cressey introduce the fictitious
criminal defendant, Peter Randolph.4 The authors suggest that Peter
Randolph's case is typical in terms of both process and outcome. One
of the problems with this technique is that it pools disparate procedures
into a composite average. For example, the authors note that "[ifn
many jurisdictions well over one half of all felony arrests are likely to
be screened out very early in the process and either dismissed outright
or filed as less serious misdemeanor charges."' Although this is indeed
the case in many jurisdictions, many others screen out far fewer felony
cases, both in terms of those dismissed and those prosecuted as
misdemeanors. 6 The same problem comes up when Rosett and Cressey
1. A. ROSETT & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE
AMERICAN COURTHOUSE (1976).
2. Id. at v.
3. Id. at 1-5.
4. Id. at 8.
5. Id. at 14.
6. See J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (forthcoming book; on file at Institute of Criminal Law and
Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.) (survey of criminal justice
systems in Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit); L. KATZ, L. LITWIN, & R. BAMBERGER, JUSTICE
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discuss judicial participation in plea negotiation. Although in many
jurisdictions judges do little more than ratify agreements between
prosecutors and defense attorneys, in others they actively participate in
the negotiation process, occasionally dominating both the tone and the
outcome of the proceeding.' The authors' representation of a single
case as "typical" brings to mind the man who, with his head in the
refrigerator and his feet in the stove, said that on the average he felt
pretty good.
The authors correctly suggest that in order for the guilty plea to be
made in a knowing fashion it must follow counsel by a competent
attorney who understands the case and has discussed it thoroughly with
his client." Given the complexities of the legal system, they reluctantly
conclude that many guilty pleas result from uncounselled decisions by
defendants.9 The authors add that "[m]any guilty pleas submitted in
American courts are not free acts of the accused; they are gained by
psychological coercion through the threat of severe punishment."10
This, the reader is told, is a result of a system designed to induce the
guilty plea.
Rosett and Cressey find that the quality of counsel available to most
indigent defendants is so low that they seriously doubt whether many
pleas are made knowingly.11 Implicit in this statement is the belief that
court-appointed attorneys and public defenders are generally less
effective than privately retained counsel. Empirical evidence refutes
such a categorical statement. One recent study has shown:
Clients of private attorneys are much more likely to make
bail, more likely to plead guilty, less likely to demand a jury
trial, and more likely to receive a felony sentence upon
conviction than clients of public defenders and court
appointed attorneys. Court appointed attorneys are more
likely to seek a jury trial, and more likely to have their
defendants acquitted. The public defender, although less
IS THE CRIME 104-15 (1972) (study of role of prosecutor in charging process in New York and
Los Angeles).
7. A. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, at 29-32 (unpublished
manuscript on file at Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law
Center, Washington, D.C.); see Ferguson, The Role of the Judge in Plea Bargaining, 15 CRIM.L.Q.
26, 31, 40-41 (1972); Gallagher, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Search for New
Standards; 9 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 29, 31-33 (1974). See generally J.
EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 6, at 83-219; Note, Judicial Participation in Guilty
Pleas-A Search for Standards, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 151 (1971) (discussion of constitutionality of
plea bargaining where trial judge active participant); 5 GA. L. REV. 809 (1971).
8. A. ROSETT & D. CRESSEY, supra note 1, at 27.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 29.
11. Id. at 27.
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likely to win either a dismissal or an acquittal for his client, is
most likely to avoid a felony sentence upon conviction.
12
Another study of 1,254 cases in Philadelphia showed that defendants
represented by the public defender received lower sentences than those
represented by privately retained counsel in four out of six offense
categories."'
Moreover, some attorneys the authors would label incompetent are
very familiar with the workings of the courthouse and are particularly
knowledgeable as to the likely outcome for given cases. Although they
might not always be knowledgeable as to the technicalities of the cases
on which they work or the elements of specific crimes, they know the
"fair market value" of particular offenses. 14 Although when sentencing
is left entirely to judges, "even top notch prosecutors and public
defenders are unable to predict the penalties that will be imposed in a
given case,"' 5 in most, if not all, jurisdictions a recognizable pattern of
judicial sentencing forms the basis for the fair market value of the
various offenses.
16
The problems of incompetent counsel and coerced guilty pleas exist
side by side in the American courtroom. Defendants probably believe
that if convicted of the offense with which they have been charged they
will receive a higher sentence than if they plead guilty. Information as
to sentence is essential if the defendant is to make a knowing plea. The
question is to what extent the implied promise of a lighter sentence
coerces the guilty plea. In most misdemeanor cases the threat of
punishment is not severe, yet defendants commonly plead guilty. Thus,
considerations other than the threat of severe punishment-including
convenience, acceptance of guilt, and expense-must contribute to the
decision. The prevailing theme of the book is that because the
sentencing laws provide for severe penalties, criminal justice prac-
titioners seek to do justice by avoiding the harshness of the law through
inducing guilty pleas. The authors apparently assume that if the threat
12. P. GREENWOOD, S. WILDHORN, E. POGGIO, M. STRUMWASSER, & P. DELEON,
PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS IN Los ANGELES COUNTY: A POLICY
PERSPECTIVE viii (1973) [hereinafter cited as P. GREENWOOD]; see id. at 52-55.
13. A. Constant, Determination of Sentence in Criminal Cases: The Guilty Plea and Related
Factors 29-30 (1971) (unpublished manuscript on file at Institute of Criminal Law & Procedure,
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.). It should be noted, however, that
Constant from his data, cannot attribute the difference solely to type of counsel. Id. at 29.
14. The term "fair market value," often called the "going rate," refers to the likely sentence
imposed in a given type of case.
15. A. ROSETT & D. CRESSEY, supra note 1, at 27.
16. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 11 (1967) (local attorneys likely familiar with
judge's sentencing pattern); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 50, 102-03 (1968) (knowledge of judge's sentencing pattern can facilitate plea bargaining).
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of severe punishment were reduced, guilty pleas would be less the result
of coercion and less frequent. Such a proposition, to my knowledge,
has never been verified empirically.
One also can question the authors' implicit assumption that
defendants who plead guilty always receive lighter sentences than those
who go to trial for the same offense. One study found that, at least in
cases involving the receipt of stolen goods, the severity of sentence was
not related to whether the defendant pleaded guilty; in fact, the average
sentence following a guilty plea exceeded that following trial. 17
Although there is also evidence to support the authors' hypothesis that
those who demand jury trial are punished more harshly,18 any
categorical statement regarding the direction and degree of sentencing
disparity is bound to be misleading. Moreover, no conclusive evidence
shows that either judges or juries routinely hand out severe sentences.
Rosett and Cressey also discuss the value of discretion as a means of
furthering justice and judicial economy. They correctly point out that
in many cases the only genuine issue is what the punishment will be,
and that this issue legitimately can be settled out of court. 19 They
maintain, however, that not all defendants have equal access to such
discretionary proceedings. 20 This, of course, is not news. Extralegal
factors, such as personal relationships between prosecutors and defense
attorneys, knowledge of the system, and racist attitudes, have a major
impact on sentencing.2' These inequities, however, apply no less to
cases that go to trial.
The authors' final attack on sentencing is that "[w]hen the
punishments meted out to criminals reflect no sense of the seriousness
of their offenses, their past records or even the appropriateness of
punishing them, it is time for a change."1 -22 They illustrate this attack by
asserting that a man may be sentenced to 10 years for stealing the
carcass of a jackass or forging a federal income tax refund check for
$2.98.23 Yet, the severity of the crime and the record of the defendant
17. A. Constant, supra note 13, at 21. Constant notes, however, that the range of offenses
included within the overall category of receiving stolen goods may detract from the validity of
these statistic9; there may be a substantial difference in the seriousness of the charges to which
defendants pleaded guilty rather than going to trial. Id. at 24-25.
18. See P. GREENWOOD, supra note 12, at 41-44, 118.
19. A. ROSETT & D. CRESSEY, supra note 1, at 35.
20. Id. at 43.
21. Denno & Cramer, The Effects of Victim Characteristics on Judicial Decision Making, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM (W.F. McDonald ed. 1976); cf. Mileski, Courtroom
Encounters: An Observation Study of a Lower Criminal Court, 5 LAW & Soc. REV. 473,488-89
(1971) (disposition of defendant's case affected by relationships among defense attorney,
prosecutor, and judge).
22. A. ROSETT & D. CRESSEY, supra note 1, at 44.
23. Id. at 153.
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strongly relate to his punishment.24 The authors' mistake is in looking
only at the sentencing structure. A better guide to how severely the law
actually is administered is the punishments that in fact are meted out.
The authors do point out the absurdity of having severe maximum
sentences that are never imposed or perhaps are used only as hammers
to induce guilty pleas. Nevertheless, the guide under which prosecutors
and defense attorneys operate is what judges are likely to impose, not
what the law states they have the authority to impose.
In one chapter the authors briefly trace the development of
discretion .in our legal system. With more than a touch of irony they
write:
But the social changes of the last century and the growth and
professionalization of the criminal justice system that
accompanied these changes created new needs for discretion.
The very universality of the legal rules demanded dis-
cretionary opportunities for interpretations and exceptions.
The organizational needs of the professionals inevitably
asserted themselves in demands for discretionary power to
make the system work. Attempts to narrow this power by
stating laws more specifically only produced more rules for
the professionals to interpret. Over time, the professionals
developed their own group sense of justice, their own values,
a subculture distinct and coherent.2"
Thus, the statutes, rules, and decisions intended to control discretion
have prompted the need for even greater discretion. Turning specifically
to the Supreme Court cases related to plea bargaining, Rosett and
Cressey conclude that "[a]s long as the defendant has a lawyer, the
prosecutor does not publicly beat him in the courtroom, and the judge
asks the right questions and receives the predictable answers, the
arranged guilty plea is now beyond challenge."' 26 For this, the Court is
scathingly criticized: "Sadly enough, the Court has not helped
Americans to decide whether this informal system of convicting and
sentencing is more or less just than the one which implemented the due
process concerns of our forefathers. "27
Despite this criticism, the authors later implicitly admit that the
Court perhaps could have done no more. They conclude their
discussion of the judicial role by stating that, regardless of whether the
judge actively participates in the plea or merely ratifies that which the
24. See DIVISION OF PROGRAM PLANNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH, NEW
YORK DEP'T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW
COMMITMENTS 1974 passim (1975); LA. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. OF CRIMINAL STA-
TISTICS, tables H-K (1974).
25. A. ROSETT & D. CRESSEY, supra note 1, at 54.
26. Id at 62.
27. Id. at 64-66.
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prosecutors and defense attorneys have agreed upon, if the system is to
work, the judge is bound by the bargain.2 8 This can make the daily
routine of judges stupefying, 9 but Rosett and Cressey do not have a
clear alternative. Moreover, the authors once again try to construct a
typical judge who handles his daily work in a typical fashion. As noted
earlier, although some judges prefer to take a hands off attitude toward
the negotiation process, others become actively involved, quizzing both
defense attorneys and prosecutors, and in some cases encouraging and
actively forcing pleas.3 0  Both types of judge inhabit American
courthouses; which form predominates is a question to be answered by
empirical research.
Turning from judges, the authors discuss the discretionary role of the
prosecutor and more generally the values and beliefs that characterize
the entire courthouse scene. Rosett and Cressey suggest that prose-
cutors, rather than seeking whatever punishment is possible in a given
offense, attempt to seek a fair and appropriate degree of punishment
for a given set of cases. 1 What is not said, however, is that prosecutors
approach this quest for justice from quite divergent perspectives. Some
seem to believe that "half a loaf is better than none" and so seek to
have a large number of defendants plead and be convicted, albeit with
moderate sentences; others will let minor infractions pass while
concentrating time and effort on convicting and punishing more serious
offenders. Each is a conception of justice; each is different.
The authors also turn their attention to the public defender and his
role in doing justice. They attempt to depict the life of a public
defender and the conflicts and the conditions under which he operates.
The public defender's office is regarded by legislatures as a necessary
evil and therefore almost invariably is funded inadequately.32 Office
policies are concerned more with efficiency and administrative neces-
sity than with full representation of clients. 33 The vignette is not
pleasant; the relationship between the public defender and district
attorney is cooperative rather than adversarial.
The major complaint the authors have with the normal functioning
of the public defender's office is the coercive element they perceive in
public defenders' urging indigent defendants to plead guilty: "[t]he
organization neither defends nor counsels; it processes." '34 Thus, the
28. Id. at 82.
29. Id at 83.
30. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
31. A. ROSETT & D. CRESSEY, supra note 1, at 92.
32. Id. at 118.
33. Id at 118-35.
34. Id. at 139.
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public defender's office functions as a form of "structural coercion" for
inducing uninformed guilty pleas from indigent clients; the client's only
real option is the certainty of a guilty plea versus the uncertainty of
trial. "A client presented with such a choice is likely to plead guilty.
However, he does not necessarily do so because he thinks the plea is in
his best interest. He does not know what his best interest is.""as The
picture painted is less than complete. Although public defenders do
operate under handicaps, like high caseloads and insufficient clerical
help, they often have difficulty in talking their clients out of pleading
guilty. Moreover, not all public defender offices are as overloaded or as
homogeneous as the authors would have us believe.16
Having examined various participants in the criminal justice system,
the authors next analyze the interaction of acquiescence and severity in
the system. Stated briefly, they posit that the criminal justice system's
insistence on acquiescence by defendants and the statutory severity of
punishments encourage guilty pleas.3 7 Acquiescence morally justifies
what we do to and with defendants. 38 Severity enables the system to
function.
The last chapter confronts the weighty problem of how the system
might be changed, particularly if it is to be made less coercive. The
writers are dubious of recommendations either to eliminate discretion
or to abolish plea bargaining.39 They also are less than enthusiastic
about an approach that would make the system more just through
technical refinements and judicialization of the process. They state
cogently that "it is time to recognize that problems of justice cannot be
solved merely by imposing an adversary system model on every facet of
the criminal justice system."40
The authors finally do present several recommendations for initiating
changes in the plea bargaining process. These recommendations focus
primarily on reducing the tendency of the bureaucracy to treat people
routinely, bringing the courthouse into a closer political relationship
35. Id. at 141.
36. Rosett and Cressey illustrate their points with the horizontal or zone method of lawyer
assignment: as the defendant moves through the court system, he is passed on to different
attorneys handling a particular phase, like bail, arraignment, preliminary hearing, and trial. Many
offices, however, operate on a case assignment basis-one lawyer for one case from start to finish.
37. A. ROSETT & D. CRESSEY, supra note 1, at 146-59.
38. Id. at 149.
39. Id. at 162-67. The authors note in their introductory chapter that:
Abolishing the negotiated guilty plea in America would be disastrous. Plea negotiation is
a central technique for settling cases in American courthouses. Without it, policemen,
prosecutors, judges, defenders and probation officers would be unable to perform the
crucial duty-to do justice.
Id. at 7.
40. Id at 169, citing Mather, Some Determinants of the Methods of Case Disposition:
Decision-Making by Public Defenders in Los Angeles, 8 LAW & Soc. REV. 187, 204 (1973).
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with its community and reducing the severity of punishment.4" Rosett's
and Cressey's solution for lowering the crime rate lies in giving everyone
a greater stake in conformity,42 an unoriginal notion that has been
explicated more fully elsewhere. 43 This stake in conformity and a
corresponding lessening of the severity of punishment, according to this
theory, would enhance the defendant's acceptance of responsibility for
his crime and, therefore, presumably place him on the track toward
being a better citizen. Unfortunately, the authors' conviction does not
eliminate, or for that matter even reduce, the conjectural nature of
their supposition.
The issues addressed in Justice by Consent are important and are at
the heart of the concept of justice. Unfortunately, the authors'
assertions and depictions are incomplete. At worst they misleadingly
attempt to typify a highly heterogeneous system. Thus, the book does
little to further knowledge regarding plea bargaining in particular
or the criminal justice system in general. It is readable, but its content is
light.
James A. Cramer*
41. A. RoSETT & D. CRESSEY, supra note 1, at 172.
42. Id. at 179.
43. See Toby, Social Disorganization and Stake in Conformity: Complementary Factors in the
Predatory Behavior of Young Hoodlums, 48 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 12, 12-17 (1957).
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